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ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER CANNOT BE UPHELD ON ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS.
The trial court's reliance on 30-3-37 was an abuse of discretion and the order
modifying decree cannot be upheld on those grounds. "The trial court's broad
discretion in making child custody [and parent time] awards is limited in that it
must be exercised within confines of legal standard set by appellate courts."
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The trial court in this
case disregarded the statutory direction and legal precedent and imposed a parenttime order that is an abuse of discretion.
The trial court abused its discretion in modifying the decree. The trial court
failed to take into consideration the impact awarding additional parent time in
excess of section 30-3-37 would have on the parties' children. The impact of one
parent's relocation, necessitating extensive travel for the exercise of parent time, is
among those factors considered by the legislature prior to enacting the relocation
statute, section 30-3-37. Section 37 strikes a balance between the needs of children
to have a close and meaningful relationship with both parents and the inherent
dangers, expenses and burdens created by long distance parenting arrangements.
That the legislature chose 150 miles as the limit for allowing parent time under 303-35 is telling. Beyond 150 miles, the danger, expense and burden of parent time,
as well as the inevitable disruption of the children's lives, becomes increasingly
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unreasonable and not in the children's best interest. It is apparent that the
legislature considered that within 150 miles, children would be able to maintain
some semblance of consistency and participation in their home lives. The burden
of the travel within that distance is presumptively outweighed by the benefit of the
increased contact with the non-custodial parent. Beyond 150 miles, the danger of
travel, the expense of travel, and the interference with the lives of the children
outweigh the benefit of parent time under 30-3-35 with the non-custodial parent.
The burden of travel imposed on Appellant in this case is unreasonable. The
trial court was well aware of the distance between Monroe, Utah, the children's
home, and Moab, Utah, Appellee's place of residence. In addition to the distance,
the highway itself is steep, winding, and treacherous. Deer are often hit by cars on
parts of the route. Snow is common from fall to spring. Requiring the parties to
drive that route two or three times each month is unreasonable. It is not in the
children's best interests.
Section 30-3-37 also places the burden of monthly parent time on the noncustodial parent. The trial court disregarded the statute and fashioned an allocation
of the travel expenses that places a slightly higher burden on Appellee, but requires
Appellant to pay travel expenses beyond those contemplated in section 30-3-37.
Neither party is in a financial position to pay the additional expense of long
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distance parent time. It is an abuse of the trial court's discretion to impose that
burden on Appellant.
Appellant is not suggesting that the children's peer interactions and activities
are more important than their relationship with their mother. To the contrary, the
children need to have a close and meaningful relationship with both of their
parents. However, when parents divorce, the relationships between children and
parents are inevitably impacted. When divorcing parents live in close geographic
proximity, Utah law dictates that the best interests of the children are served by
having, at a minimum, contact with the non-custodial parent on the schedule found
in section 30-3-35. When divorcing parent live further apart, the legislature has
~

determined that the best interests of the children are best served by reducing the
number of visits with the non-custodial parent, but increasing the duration of those

~

visits. In addition to the risk of travel and the cost as mentioned above, the impact
on the children of being removed from their home and community environment

I@

also comes into play. Under the current order, the children are completely
removed from their home and community every other weekend. Because of this
removal, the children lose many of the vital and formative experiences of

~

childhood, including participation in sports, boy scout groups, and so forth. This is
not to say that such participation is, in itself, more important than spending time
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with Appellee. It is one factor of many the legislature considered in enacting
section 30-3-37.
THERE WAS No MATERIAL CHANGE OF CmcUMSTANCES SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER.

Appellee apparently argues that because of the fact that the children would
get older was not specifically mentioned in the original decree of divorce, that it
was not contemplated at the time the decree was entered, and that a change in their
ages was therefore a change not anticipated at the time of trial. This argument
lacks merit. Everyone involved in the original trial was well aware that children
grow as they age. There was no evidence presented at trial that any of the children
had issues that would stunt their growth or limit their development. The trial court
plainly took into consideration the children growing up in fashioning its order as
all trial courts, often subconsciously, do in making custody orders. The trial
court's reliance on the children growing up as a previously unanticipated change of
circumstances is in error.
Appellee devotes much of her brief to her argument that a finding of a
material change of circumstances is unnecessary and that the court's order
modifying the decree should be upheld on alternative grounds. Her admission is
that there was no material change of circumstances supports Appellant's arguments
as outlined in the his original brief.
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THE APPEAL IS NOT FRlvOLOUS.

Appellant's appeal is well-founded on statute and case law. There is nothing
frivolous in the appeal that would support an award of fees to Appellee. Rule 33 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a :friv:olous appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not
warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argwnent to
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or
other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for
any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the
cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only the party filing the
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.

As outlined in his original brief, and in this reply brief, the trial court has
abused its discretion in modifying the decree. Appellant's argwnents are made in
the plain reading and application of Utah law, particularly section 30-3-37, and the
cases interpreting the parent time statues. The appeal is not motivated by a desire
to limit Appellee's contact with the children. The appeal is not motivated by a
desire to increase Appellee's legal expenses. The purpose of the appeal is to put
the children in the situation that meets their best interests under the difficult
circumstances created by the parties' divorce.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this brief and the original brief of Appellant, this
court should reverse the order of the trial court and order that Autem' s parent time
be consistent with the schedule stated in the relocation statute.
DATED this t;9:l!::day of August, 2015.
BRINDLEY SULLIVAN, PLLC

~,

Brent M. Brindley
Attorneys for Respondent and Appellant
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